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Qualitative-consciousness arises at the sensory level of olfactory processing and pervades
our experience of smells to the extent that qualitative character is maintained whenever
we are aware of undergoing an olfactory experience. Building upon the distinction
between Access and Phenomenal Consciousness the paper offers a nuanced distinction
between Awareness and Qualitative-consciousness that is applicable to olfaction in a
manner that is conceptual precise and empirically viable. Mounting empirical research
is offered substantiating the applicability of the distinction to olfaction and showing that
olfactory qualitative-consciousness can occur without awareness, but any olfactory state
that we are aware of being in is always qualitative. Evidence that olfactory sensory states
have a qualitatively character in the absence of awareness derives from research on
mate selection, the selection of social preference for social interaction and acquaintances,
as well as the role of olfactory deficits in causing affective disorders. Furthermore, the
conservation of secondary processing measures of olfactory valence during olfactory
imagery experiments provides verification that olfactory awareness is always qualitatively
conscious—all olfactory consciousness smells phenomenal.
Keywords: consciousness, olfaction, awareness, qualitative-consciousness, access-consciousness, phenomenal-
consciousness, olfactory imagery, anosmia
INTRODUCTION
Smells have a profound impact upon our daily behavior and over-
all quality of life even in the absence of our subjectively attending
to them. There is mounting evidence that qualitative olfactory
consciousness occurs in the absence of conscious awareness, how-
ever, what is even more fascinating is whenever we are aware of a
smell it is qualitatively-conscious as well. Thus, it will be argued
that all olfactory consciousness smells phenomenal.
The paper offers a nuanced distinction between Awareness and
Qualitative-consciousness that is applicable to olfaction in a man-
ner that is conceptual precise and empirically viable. Applying this
distinct to empirical literature on olfaction shows that these kinds
of consciousness do not fully dissociate for the entire modality
of olfaction. Olfactory qualitative-consciousness can occur in the
absence of awareness, but any olfactory state that we are aware of
being in is always qualitatively conscious.
Debates regarding the nature of consciousness and its taxo-
nomic kinds, often become conceptually murky, so it is best to
initially clarify the terminological usages before entering into a
discussion of the empirical evidence in support of each kind of
consciousness. Pre-theoretically being aware, signifies that we can
subjectively report undergoing the experience, being in the rele-
vant state, and the content of the state. For my purposes I shall
use awareness, to pick out that state in which the subject can
report being in a state S with content p (or if you prefer, they
are conscious of undergoing experience E that is of, or about,
object x). Awareness, I shall stipulate, can be understood sepa-
rately from qualitative-consciousness, such that an organism is in
a qualitatively conscious state when there is something that it is
like for it to undergo experience E which is distinguishable from
undergoing experience E∗, and moreover the subject need neither
be aware of being in state S (i.e., undergoing E) nor of state S’s
content p.
REFINING PHENOMENALITY
Of the many treatments of consciousness, few have been as
influential in consciousness studies as access and phenomenal
consciousness. Block (1995) is responsible for the claim that the
concept of consciousness is not a cluster concept containing dif-
ferent kinds of relevantly similar concepts but a mongrel contain-
ing different kinds. The two kinds that Block is keen to distinguish
are Access-consciousness and Phenomenal-consciousness (1993,
1995, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2009). However, the difference between
these kinds of consciousness is defintionally opaque. Semantic
and definitional clarity aside, a major difficulty with the distinc-
tion between A-consciousness and P-consciousness is that some-
times these states are differentiated and identified according to
their representational content as an information processing issue
(Block, 1996, 2007, 2008), while at other times P-conscious states
are ostensitvely defines in light of their qualitative properties
(Block, 1993, 1995).
Furthermore, the difference between these kinds of conscious-
ness has been challenged as conceptually ambiguous (Rosenthal,
2002, 2007, 2009, 2010) and incapable of scientific investigation
(Kouider et al., 2012). Moreover, a review of the literature on
olfaction suggests the distinction between these kinds of con-
scious states might not be applicable to olfaction, because the
experiential nature of A-consciousness and P-consciousness differs
from the other modalities based on olfaction’s unique neural
architecture (Stevenson, 2009).
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While the distinction on offer could be encompassed within
Block’s framework of A-consciousness and P-consciousness, fur-
ther modulations and refinements of his usage of phenomenal-
consciousness would be required, and as currently stated
qualitative-consciousness and awareness provide greater preci-
sion and clarity in demarcation the relationship between these
kinds of consciousness that is substantiated by experimental
evidence from olfaction contrary to Stevenson’s (2009) claim.
Though it might be worried that further distinctions need-
lessly generate greater terminological ambiguity in an already
murky subject, distinguishing between awareness and qualitative-
consciousness provides clarity and nuanced evidence for the
dissociation and relation between the two kinds of conscious-
ness that Block’s distinction is meant to track. As such what
is offered is not meant to supplant Block’s theory, but supple-
ment it in a manner that can encompass the nature of olfactory
consciousness.
Block’s definition of phenomenal consciousness might be
interpreted in one of two ways: as referring to states that have
a qualitative character for the subject and which are conscious
though not reportable or not fully accessible; or to states that
have a qualitative character though the subject is in no way aware
of being in the state (Rosenthal, 2002, 2007, 2009). The first
interpretation corresponds to Nagel’s (1974) what-it-is-likeness
(WiiL) when the subject is aware of being in state S and S has a
qualitative character though its content is not reportable or fully
accessible. Nagel’s precise usage of the phrase requires that there
is a WiiL for the creature undergoing the experience. The notion
of a phenomenal character of experience from a subjective point
of view is inherent to the concept of WiiL. The latter interpreta-
tion of P-consciousness corresponds to qualitative-consciousness,
since the subject is unaware of being in state S, yet S has a qualita-
tive character of experience. This later kind arguably corresponds
to that supported by Block’s evidence for phenomenal conscious-
ness from subliminal vision and extinction studies (Block, 2001,
2007, 2008, 2011).
Disambiguating these two kinds of phenomenality clarifies
how the distinction of qualitative-consciousness and awareness
offers greater theoretical nuance in demonstrating that qual-
itative olfactory states can occur in the absence of subjec-
tive awareness. The fuller conception of phenomenality as a
WiiL cannot be employed in providing empirical evidence for
the dissociation of these kinds of consciousness as it smug-
gles in awareness. Assuming WiiL would muddy the first half
of my thesis that olfactory qualitative-consciousness occurs in
the absence of awareness, since some manner of subjective
awareness is inherent to these states, and begs the question
in the second half of the thesis that olfactory awareness is
always qualitative. Olfactory consciousness using the distinc-
tion between awareness and qualitative-consciousness demon-
strates what the original distinction was intended to capture.
Qualitative-consciousness does not smuggle in any aspect of
awareness and secondary processing measures can establish the
phenomenality of these states in the absence of any manner of
awareness.
Methodologically employing a robust notion of aware-
ness and contrastively the thinnest conception of phenomenal
(qualitative) consciousness allows for greater conceptual clarity.
Qualitative-consciousness provides the starkest way of show-
ing that phenomenality can occur without subjective awareness.
Furthermore, by stripping the subjective aspect from qualita-
tively consciousness states there should be no worry that some
residue of subjective consciousness is smuggled in when it is
shown that olfactory states that we are aware of being in are always
qualitatively conscious.
QUALITATIVE CHARACTER AND SECONDARY PROCESSING
MEASURES
It is no longer controversial that unconscious states and their
content can mediate behavior and be employed in sequences of
information processing, thus establishing that we can undergo
cognitive states in the absence of awareness is difficult but
not an insurmountable feat. The real challenge is establishing
that states we are subjectively unaware of being in can have a
qualitative character i.e., that there is something that it is like
for the subject to undergo the experience in accordance with
the aforementioned discussion of qualitative-consciousness [for
further discussions of qualitative character including alterna-
tive conception see Young et al. (2014) in this research topic].
Attempts at demonstrating the qualitative character of uncon-
scious states by inference from their similarity to conscious states
often encounter the worry that the qualitative aspect present in
the conscious experience is simply missing in the absence of
awareness. If we cannot report the qualitative character of these
states what evidence do we have of their qualitative character?
One strategy for ascertaining the qualitative nature of subjec-
tively unreportable states is Quality-Space Theory, which iden-
tifies the mental qualities in terms of their perceptual roles, such
that we can ascertain the qualitative nature of these states inde-
pendent of conscious awareness (Rosenthal, 1991, 1999, 2005,
2010; Clark, 1993). While this approach is applicable to olfac-
tion (Young et al., 2014), the perceptual quality of olfactory
valence permits a stronger line of evidence using secondary pro-
cessing measures, which establish that the qualitative property
is maintained even in the absence of awareness. Odor valence
together with secondary processingmeasures provide an objective
method of ascertaining the existence of qualitative character in the
absence of awareness, thereby providing the means for demon-
strating that qualitative-consciousness can occur in the absence
of awareness.
The difficulty is assessing whether experiential qualities are
preserved from veridical odor perception through olfactory states
that we are unaware of undergoing. Since the veracity of subjective
self-reports is difficult to measure and question begging in this
situation, secondary-processing measures might be employed to
verify that the qualitative character is conserved. Secondary pro-
cesses are correlated properties or incidental effects (Cummins
et al., 2001), such as speed, error rate, types of errors, or fatigue
etc., of the system when it performs a task. In addition to a state’s
performance of a role, other secondary properties can be used
to evaluate whether the role was performed utilizing the same
physical realization.
Secondary processing measures are traditionally employed in
debates regarding computational implementations of cognitive
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abilities, however, analogous measures are available in measur-
ing perceptual states. In olfactory research the property of valence
(the perceive pleasant or unpleasant property of an odor) pro-
vides just such needed measures for assessing a states qualita-
tive properties independent of awareness. Behavioral measures
such as sniff rate and volume, response time, and heart rate
can all be used as independent measures of perceived valence
that indicate the olfactory system is treating these stimuli in
the same fashion regardless of whether we can subjectively
report our perception of the qualitative character. Sniff rates
relative to odor concentration and valence substantiate the infer-
ence that subjectively unaware olfactory states have a qualitative
character.
There is a long history of considering the primary quali-
ties of odors to be their pleasantness or unpleasantness. Plato is
the most well-known instance of the claim that smells are pri-
marily individuated in terms of their olfactory valence (Timaeus
66d–67b; Plato, 1997), which is echoed within Indian Philosophy
(McHugh, 2012, Ch. 2). More recently it has been argued that
valence is the primitive property that determinates odor identity
(Yeshurun and Sobel, 2010). Unlike the identification and catego-
rization of odor quality that is similar but varies across cultures
there is greater agreement on the categorization and identifica-
tion of odors using the properties of pleasant or unpleasantness
(Haddad et al., 2010). However, recent evidence suggests that
though valence might be a primitive property of odor’s, the object
of olfactory experience is more likely identified by humans in
terms of its olfactory quality and not valence (Olofsson et al.,
2012). Whether olfactory quality or valence is the property that
determines odor identity, valence is considered to be one of the
most basic perceptible qualities possessed by odors.
Sniff rates relative to odor concentration and valence provide
confirmation of an olfactory state’s qualitative character. Humans
modulate their sniff rate and volume 150ms after the onset of a
stimulus relative to its concentration and valence (Johnson et al.,
2003). The stimulus dependent response of human sniffing is
such that intense and unpleasant odorants are sniffed less vig-
orously and with a decreased volume. Measurement of olfactory
motor responses to odorants is reliable enough to be used as a
non-verbal measure of human’s detection and categorization of
the odor (Frank et al., 2003). Additionally, anosmics show no
such response indicating that the sniff response only occurs in
accordance with the subject’s experiencing the valence of the pre-
sented stimulus (Harland and Frank, 1997). Sniff rate and volume
are not the only secondary measures for assessing odor valence.
Response time is faster in detection and discrimination tasks for
unpleasant odors (Bensafi et al., 2003a) and heart rate measure-
ments show that we involuntarily categorize unpleasant odors
(Bensafi et al., 2002).
In what follows it will be noted whenever secondary process-
ing measures of odor valence can be used to establish that the
state has a qualitative character. Furthermore, it will be argued
that this aspect of olfactory processing together with the distinc-
tion of qualitative-consciousness and awareness allows a nuanced
treatment of consciousness that can empirically support the claim
that we can undergo qualitative experiences in the absence of
awareness.
OLFACTORY SENSORY STATES ARE PHENOMENALLY
CONSCIOUS
Olfactory sensory states have a qualitative character even in the
absence of awareness. Evidence that olfactory sensory states have
a qualitatively character in the absence of awareness, derives from
research on mate selection, the selection of social preference for
social interaction and acquaintances, as well as the role of olfac-
tory deficits in causing affective disorders1. While none of these
phenomena are decisive on their own and further research is
certainly required, when taken together they provide a host of
initial evidence indicating that qualitative-consciousness can arise
independently of awareness.
MATE SELECTION
Evidence for the qualitative character of olfactory sensory states
can be gleaned from research on mate selection. Further research
on human olfactory mate selection is required, but the initial data
indicates that mate selection in humans is influenced by smell
(reviewed in Havlicek and Roberts, 2009)2. Wemight not be aware
of it, but our reason for choosing sexual partners might be that
their immune system smells pleasant to us.
Using olfactory cues we select mates based on the synergy of
our combined immune systems for producing stronger offspring.
If we mate with a partner whose major histocompatibility com-
plex (MHC, alternatively termed human leukocyte antigen, HLA,
in humans) is the converse of our own, this generates offspring
with a more robust hybrid immune system. Thus, it is adaptive to
be able to detect the structure of a possible mate’s MHC.
However, the difficulty of studying human mate selection
is readily apparent given our inability to control for interven-
ing variables. Most studies examining HLA mate choice have
proven inconclusive, which could be attributed to these studies
1Blind smell is an olfactory phenomenon reminiscent of aspects of Blind Sight
that is not nearly as well studied, but preliminary studies (Schwartz et al.,
1994; Schwartz, 2000; Sobel et al., 1999) suggest that some healthy human
subjects can detect the presence of an odor in the absence of subjective aware-
ness. A subgroup of subjects in Schwartz et al.’s experiment provides suggestive
evidence that olfactory qualitative states can occur in the absence of aware-
ness. However, further research needs to be conducted to see the prevalence
of sensitive subjects in the overall population using more robust measures for
determining odor detection threshold than those employed by Schwartz et al.
to ascertain that the subject was unaware of the odor stimulus. Additionally,
Sobel et al.’s results are suggestive of there being dose dependent unconscious
olfactory processing, but the qualitative status of these states is dubious, since
their detection task employed a subliminal odor without any further measure
of subjective feedback.Without further measures of the subject’s experience of
these stimuli the claim that these unconscious experience contained proper-
ties that are qualitative is unwarranted. This is not to discount the findings of
both sets of experiments, but only to point out that further research is require
before the phenomenon can provide support for the claim that olfactory
qualitative-consciousness can occur in the absence of awareness.
2The nature and debate regarding human pheromones is irrelevant to all
claims regarding the olfactory mediation of human mate selection within this
paper, since all the evidence derives from olfactory perception utilizing the
olfactory epithelium through higher levels of olfactory processing. The phe-
nomena under discussion in this section does not conform to the definitional
nature of pheromones and is not mediate by the veromenasal system as is the
case in other mammals (for a more in depth treatment of pheromones consult
Doty, 2010).
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being conducted in heterogeneous populations in which the con-
founding effects of ethnic or racial self-preference could not be
controlled. Nonetheless the importance of smell in mate selection
cannot be discounted. Based on questionares rating the factors of
mate selection, female subjects rated body odor as one of the most
important factors in selecting sexual partners (Herz and Cahill,
1997; Herz and Inzlicht, 2002).
The qualitative character of a prospective mate’s body odor
plays a role in determining our choice of sexual partners, but
to establish that this is related to odors derived by our HLA
compounds, as detected by the olfactory system, and these medi-
ate actual mate selection requires three steps. First, it will be
shown that humans can detect and discriminate the same MHC
compounds that determine olfactory mate selection in rodents.
Second, it will be shown that we have the ability to detect the
olfactory signature of HLA compounds and that these are treated
as having a qualitative property. Lastly, the literature of actual
human mate selection in relation to HLA compatibility will be
selectively reviewed.
The causal mechanism for HLA detection is arguably the same
as themechanism responsible forMHCdetection and recognition
in animal models. Odors derived from MHC compounds play a
role in determining mate selection in rodents. In mice and rats
it has been demonstrated that MHC recognition is accomplished
by the olfactory system (Yamazaki et al., 1979, 1980; Ehman and
Scott, 2001). Further research has also shown that mice, rats, and
humans can smell the difference between the urinary scents of
rodents derived from different MHC strains of mice (Beauchamp
et al., 1985). Taken together, these studies show that mammals
certainly employ MHC-based mate selection and that the human
olfactory system is sensitive to these same chemicals. When these
findings regarding our olfactory sensitivity are combined with the
research on human mate selection, strong evidence emerges that
we engage in HLA-based mate selection as mediated by olfactory
cues, in the same manner as other mammals.
Odors derived from our HLA not only mediate mate selection,
but it can be shown that these odors have a qualitative character.
Using two-day-old sweaty t-shirts of men, experimenters deter-
mined that females judge a t-shirt’s odor most pleasant when it
was derived from a man whose HLA system differed from their
own (Wedekind et al., 1995; Jacob et al., 2002). In both these
studies no single male body odor was universally agreed to be
pleasant smelling; hedonic judgments differed across females rel-
ative to the dissimilarity of the donor’s HLA. Themajor difference
between these studies is that in Wedekind et al.’s study the more
dissimilar the HLA, the stronger the hedonic rating; while Jacob’s
results displayed a degree of HLA overlap in paternal lineage
implicated in the hedonic rating of the sweaty odor. Nevertheless,
both studies clearly implicate the olfactory system as a possible
means for selecting mates based on the qualitative character of
body odor as determined by HLA.
However, these positive results at best establish a correlation
effect between the MHC of the donor and judged pleasantness.
Recently the work of Aksenov et al. (2012) demonstrated that
MHC yields volatile odor compounds (VOC) at the cellular level.
Their study was the first to demonstrate that MHC compounds
give off unique detectable odor signatures, such that a change in a
single allele produces unique odor fingerprint at the cellular level.
The implication of these results is that each person unique genetic
makeup and in particular HLA complex will generate VOCs with
a unique odor signature, thus allowing the connection between
the judged hedonic profile of complimentary HLA mates and the
possibility that this is directly determined by the VOC generate by
a person’s MHC compounds.
Further evidence that humans can detect the odor profile gen-
erated by the HLA complex can be found in studies of perfume
selection. Pre-theoretic intuitions suggest that humans perfume
themselves to mask their body odor, since body odor on its own
is commonly perceived as unpleasant. However, Milinski and
Wedekind (2001) disproved the masking hypothesis by showing
that we select perfumes that enhance our natural body odor. Not
only is this effect only found for the self-selection of fragrances,
which is explained by the fact that people usually purchase fra-
grances for themselves (Jellinek, 1951; Le Norcy, 1991), but also
that the judged pleasantness of an odor as correlated with body
odor was consistent over a 2 year period and not a matter of
changing fashion.
In addition to a perfumes enhancement of the pleasantness
of perceived body odor, Lenochova et al. (2012) discovered that
a self-selected perfume boosted the judged pleasantness of body
odor relative to each person, as shown by their control that pre-
sented a mixture of body odor and equally pleasant perfume that
had not been selected by the subject did not generate the same
judged odor enhancement. However, it should be noted that their
study was only conducted with male subjects. Since, female body
odor is generally less intense making it more likely prone to a
masking effect, further research was required.
Recently Milinski et al. (2013) used female subjects to address
this concern and replicated their previous findings that we can
select perfumes based on the MHC profile of oneself but not
others. Fragrances similar to the VOC given off by ones own
MHC have a boosting effect on body odor. Moreover, using
fMRI imaging Milinsky et al.’s study revealed specific activa-
tion to peptides consistent with humans’ ability to detect MHC
associated olfactory cues. Thus, HLA compounds generate VOC
with a qualitative character that we can detect and behaviorally
respond to.
The strongest evidence that human mate selection prefer-
ences are driven by avoidance of those with HLA haplotypes
identical to ours is derived from Ober et al.’s (1997) study of
Hutterite mate choice. Previous studies did not show an effect
of HLA on mate selection, but were conducted in heteroge-
neous populations where olfactory factors of mate selection
might have been overridden by socio-economic and ethnic fac-
tors. The Hutterite population served as a control, because it
is a small homogenous population with easily traceable genetic
lineages. By looking at the HLA haplotype matches between
spouses, they concluded that less of an overlap existed than would
otherwise be expected if the selection processes were random.
Ober et al. concluded that MHC based mate choice is operant
even in humans. Furthermore, they suggest that the mecha-
nism for HLA detection and structural comparison might be
mediated by the olfactory system. The olfactory system is quite
capable of such chemical structural analysis and comparison,
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 713 | 4
Young Olfactory qualitative-consciousness and awareness
as demonstrated by the aforementioned results that humans
can detect and discriminate the relevant MHC odorants in
rodents, are sensitive to MHC compounds of their own body
odor, and judge body odors of complimentary HLAs as more
pleasant.
TheOber et al study is by far themost significant source of data
on the role of MHC in actual mate choice in humans, because
of its methodological soundness using a large sample within a
closed homogenous population thereby controlling for social and
ethnic confounds. Of the studies on the role of MHC in mate
choice only four have shown that MHC is significant in determin-
ing actual mate choice (Giphart and D’Amaro, 1983; Rosenberg
et al., 1983; Ober et al., 1997; Chaix et al., 2008), while seven
have shown no significance (Pollack et al., 1982; Nordlander et al.,
1983; Sans et al., 1994; Jin et al., 1995; Ihara et al., 2000; Garver-
Apgar et al., 2006). However, it should be noted that aside from
the most recent study (Chaix et al., 2008) which showed a limited
effect in only their European American grouping, the previous
studies with positive results all used large sample sizes, thus con-
trolling for the variegated properties of genetic variation as well
as additional societal and normative practices in selecting mates.
The null results of previous studies might simply be attributed
to lack of power due to small sample sizes in attempting to
determine a complex human behavior with multiple intervening
variables.
Most recently Chaix et al. (2008) showed that MHC mate
selection is apparent in European and American populations,
but not in African Yoruba populations. However, the statisti-
cal methods of testing their hypothesis was criticized, because
the significance could be attribute to extreme mate pairs within
the groups, as well as for not correctly adjusting their statisti-
cal thresholds for multiple hypothesis testing (Derti et al., 2010).
After adjusting their previous results for multiple hypotheses
(Laurent and Chaix, 2012), the critics agreed (Derti and Roth,
2013) that MHC based mate selection was an apparent, but not
a robust result, which might simply be attributed to the small
sample size. Further research is certainly called for on the role
of VOC given off by MHC compounds in humans in the selec-
tion of mates across cultures. Currently the evidence indicates
that odorant detection of MHC compounds influences sexual
mates selection, but the extent and mechanism require further
study using more stringent and universal methodologies with
large samples (Havlicek and Roberts, 2009).
The argument put forward in this section is that VOCs derived
from HLA have properties with qualitative character that are
perceived using the olfactory system and modulate our mate
selection behavior. Yet, we are not commonly aware of smells
in general (Sela and Sobel, 2010) nor their specifically modula-
tion our selection of mates. Further research is required using
the secondary measures of odor valence (i.e., sniff rate and vol-
ume, response time, and heart rate) relative to the subliminal
presentation of olfactory stimuli derived from the VOC of sim-
ilar and dissimilar sets of HLA subjects to fully establish that HLA
mate selection occurs in the absence of awareness based on gen-
uinely qualitative states. However, at this initial stage the evidence
strongly suggests that we select mates based upon the qualitative
character of our olfactory states even in the absence of awareness.
SOCIAL ACQUAINTANCE SELECTION
Further evidence that olfactory sensory states have a qualita-
tive character in the absence of awareness, can be derived from
research on olfaction’s effect in guiding social preferences. While
it is uncontroversial that our awareness of perceived smells mod-
ulate our mood and affective responses toward people (Herz and
Schooler, 2002; Jacob et al., 2002), subliminally pleasant and nox-
ious odors can modulate our ratings of the likeability of social
acquaintances (Li et al., 2007). Li et al.’s study showed that the
valence of an odorant subliminally modulates social preference.
Using a simple odor detection task (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral,
and control) combined with a subjective rating of the likeability
of pictures of faces, they demonstrated that pleasant and unpleas-
ant odors presented subliminally, both had a physiological effect
and modulated the subject’s affective response toward pictures of
human faces.
Independent of subjective awareness there was a significant
change in the heart rate of each subject relative to the valence
of the subliminal odors, thereby confirming the qualitative char-
acter of these states employing secondary processing measures.
Furthermore, unpleasant odorants caused the subject to rate
the face as being less likable, while pleasant odorants had the
opposite effect. The modulation of likability relative to odor-
ant valence only occurred with subliminal odorants and quickly
disappeared if the subject was aware of the smell. Even in the
absence of subjective awareness the odorant has a qualitative
property of valence, which has a causal effect upon our predica-
tion of qualitative properties to others. Arguably this shows that
qualitative-consciousness is independent of our subjective aware-
ness of the pleasant or unpleasant character of the odor. Even if
one is unaware of undergoing an olfactory experience, the valence
of subliminal odorants are implicated in social acquaintance
selection. I might like you, because you smell nice.
ANOSMIA—ARGUMENT FROM ABSENCE
A severely unethical, but clearly conclusive, experiment could
be performed to test whether qualitative-consciousness arises
at the sensory level of olfactory processing in the absence of
awareness. The experiment would be to sever the olfactory tract
in healthy humans to see if they could undergo qualitatively-
conscious olfactory states. Though this experiment is ethically
unfeasible some olfactory pathologies provide subjects with sim-
ilar deficits that suggest it is not possible to have olfactory
qualitative-consciousness without olfactory sensory states.
Anosmia is the most common disorder of olfactory pathology
in which individuals lose their sense of smell. In some cases anos-
mia is due to the presence of a psychological disorder, but the vast
majority of cases result from damage to the olfactory bulb either
due to infection or head trauma. Individuals with fully functional
olfactory systems modulate their sniffing in accordance with the
pleasant or unpleasant character of an odor, yet anosmics show
no such response (Harland and Frank, 1997) demonstrating that
the sniff response only occurs when the subject perceives the
valence of the presented stimulus. Thus, using secondary process-
ing measures it is arguably the case that anosmic individuals lack
the ability to perceptually experience the qualitative character of
olfactory valence.
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In addition to their inability to perceive olfactory stimuli,
anosmic individuals also experience a decrease in their hedonic
quality of life (Miwa et al., 2001) and motivational anhedonia
(Keller and Malaspina, 2013) that is often causally implicated in
the further development of depression (Deems et al., 1991)3. We
are not aware of our olfactory experiences most of the time, but
they imbue our lives with a qualitative character of experience,
which is most striking in their absence.
To summarize, the Argument from Absence is that the absence
of olfactory sensory states and anosmics inability to experience
the qualitative valence of odors are causally implicated in lower
quality of life scores and depression. Hence, these states are
responsible for generating qualitative-consciousness even in the
absence of awareness. The argument might not prove that all
olfactory sensory states have a qualitative character, but the evi-
dence certainly is significant and nicely fits with the mounting
evidence thus far.
NO OLFACTORY AWARENESS WITHOUT
QUALITATIVE-CONSCIOUSNESS
Evidence for the claim that olfactory awareness is always
qualitatively-conscious might be derived from first-person
reports and the reader’s own awareness of olfactory experiences.
Introspecting, remembering, or imagining an odor, tokens some
manner of qualitative olfactory experience. Just thinking about
the smell of the fresh cut grass elicits an olfactory experience for
me. However, using first-person reports of phenomenologymight
be methodologically questionable. Aside from biasing us to only
consider experiences that we are aware of as having a qualitative
character, the veracity of olfactory first-person reports might be
doubted given our limited attention to olfactory experience and
subsequent lack of awareness of our experience of odors (Sela and
Sobel, 2010).
Veridical odor perception could establish that anytime we are
aware of an olfactory experience it has a qualitative character, but
it is not a good test case. Situations of perceiving olfactory stim-
uli will activate a sensory state, which the previous section argued
are qualitatively conscious, thereby making one aware of an olfac-
tory quality. Consequently, anytime we are aware of perceiving
an odor, the conscious state has a qualitative character, because
qualitative sensory states are elicited as part of creating the per-
ceptual state. Because first-person phenomenological reports are
methodologically questionable and perceptual statesmight always
have a qualitative character, olfactory imagery will serve as the test
case for the conditional claim that if we are aware of an olfactory
state then it must be qualitatively-conscious as well.
Methodologically one could exhaustively search for a case
in which we are perceptually aware of an odor and yet the
experience does not have any qualitative character. However, a
stronger and more fatal test of my claim would be to find a
state, such as olfactory imagery that is not perceptual, that we
3These studies of anosmia do not specify the nature of the anatomical damage,
since their focus is upon the resultant olfactory deficit. Thus, to fully test the
claim that qualitative-consciousness occurs at the sensory level in olfaction in
the absence of awareness further research needs to be conducted on anosmia
resulting from a severed olfactory tract.
commonly do not think would be qualitative, and that people
find difficult eliciting in the first place (Herz, 2000) and check
if these cases of olfactory awareness are qualitatively conscious.
High-level cognitive states concerning olfactory experience are
paradigmatic test cases of conscious awareness where we would
not expect some level of qualitative character. What will be
shown is that just thinking about odors, even those that we have
not previously experienced, will elicit a qualitative character of
experience.
While the phenomenon of olfactory imagery is primarily con-
ceived as an issue regarding the representational format of cog-
nitive states in an analogous manner to visual imagery (Kosslyn,
2003; Kosslyn et al., 2003; Pylyshyn, 2003), it demonstrates that
we can elicit a qualitative experience of a smell in the absence of
an olfactory stimulus (reviewed in Rinck et al., 2009). Olfactory
imagery demonstrates that all states of olfactory awareness are
also qualitatively-conscious. Experimentally it has been shown
that subjects can elicit the qualitative experience of smelling
something in the absence of olfactory stimuli. Merely introspect-
ing, imagining, or thinking about a smell elicits a qualitative
experience of smelling an odor.
Even more fascinating is that olfactory imagery states mimic
those of ordinary olfactory experiences such as odor mixing
(Algom and Cain, 1991). Odor mixing experiments yield the
interesting results that, when two similar odorants are combined
to yield a configural compound, the resulting complex’s odor
is different from those of its constituents parts, while odorants
that are dissimilar yield elemental compounds in which the odors
of the constituents are clearly discernable. However, by simply
changing the concentrations of the constituents, one can shift
an elemental compound to a configural compound. What is of
interest in olfactory imagery is that if one is asked to imagine
the mixture of two odors and report the olfactory quality of the
compound, the reports will mimic those given when smelling the
actual odor.
However, for olfactory imagery to fully demonstrate that states
of olfactory awareness are qualitative-consciousness it must be
shown that these state’s content and experiential properties are
the same as the perceptual state. The most obvious way to test
for such an overlap of content and qualities would be based on
self-reports as employed in Algom and Cain’s (1991) study, yet
these must be marginalized for the same reasons as introspective
reports of past olfactory experiences—we simply cannot method-
ically test the veracity of subjective self-reports regarding olfactory
imagery (Djordjevic et al., 2004).
Self-reports are doubtless invaluable tools, but they must be
corroborated with other measures of the content and qualitative
character. If olfactory imagery is to demonstrate that whenever
we are aware of an olfactory experience there is a qualitative
character of experience what needs to be shown is that these
imaginary creations of an olfactory state have the same experi-
ential properties as if the subject where perceiving the imagined
stimulus. A review of the literature on olfactory imagery sug-
gests that this can be demonstrated using the similarity of sniff
patterns between veridical perception and olfactory imagination.
The sniffing patterns are similar between both types of experi-
ences suggesting that to elicit an olfactory qualitative experience
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one must manipulate the olfactory epithelium and bulb (the sen-
sory states), which then recreates the experience by activating the
olfactory cortex (Djordjevic et al., 2005; Bensafi et al., 2007; Rinck
et al., 2009). To think about a smell, one must token the ini-
tial sensory and perceptual states, which are arguably qualitatively
conscious.
However, a more recent set of experiments (Tomiczek and
Stevenson, 2009) calls this into question and argues that the
same perceptual state is not elicited, rather similar structures
that are utilized for olfactory perception in general are activated.
Tomiczek and Stevenson (2009) assert that we do not imagine a
specific odor, rather there is a general overall increase in activa-
tion across areas in the olfactory system that are responsive to
odorants similar to the imagined odor. While their results indi-
cate that the imagine state does not have the same exact content
it does focus us in the right direction. Though these states might
not be fully identical, secondary processing measures can be uti-
lized to establish that the best explanation of their content must
involve qualitative character.
The methodology of verifying the qualitative character of
an imaginary mental experience as being the same as veridical
perception using measures of sniffing is currently employed in
olfactory imagery studies. Using olfactory motor activity dur-
ing imagery as a criterion to test the veracity of participants
claimed imagined olfactory percept, Bensafi et al. (2003a,b) con-
firmed that the same sniff parameters including sniff volume
occur in imagery as in conscious veridical perception. They not
only showed that sniffing is sensory dependent, but also sniffing
in a similar fashion to veridical perception produce qualitatively
more robust olfactory imagery (Bensafi et al., 2005; Bensafi and
Rouby, 2007). Employing the same secondary processes increased
the capacity for generating olfactory images and the strength of
the olfactory quality indicating that these subjects had olfactory
experiences with qualitative character.
Kleemann et al. (2009) lend further support to the conser-
vation of sniff rates as indicating the preservation of the same
olfactory quality of experience and extended them to breath-
ing patterns. The overall sniff volume and breathing amplitudes
are the same between imaginary and perceptual olfactory states.
Subjects not only reported an ability to imagine an odor in these
experiments, they also breathe and sniff in the same fashion as
if they actually perceived the odor. Moreover preventing subjects
from sniffing while imagining smells decreases the vividness of
the imagined smell (Arshamian et al., 2008). These results fur-
ther solidify the claim that olfactory imagery states are contentful
cognitive states with qualitative character.
Additional secondary measures of response time and heart
rate lend further confirmation of the qualitative nature of these
imagined states. Response time is faster in detection and dis-
crimination tasks for unpleasant odors (Bensafi et al., 2003a) and
heart rate measurements show that we involuntarily categorize
unpleasant odors (Bensafi et al., 2002). Given the role of sniffing
in modulating olfactory imagery it is unsurprising that olfactory
imagery increases our detection rate of the target odor in a man-
ner that is modality and content specific (Djordjevic et al., 2004,
2005). The subject’s experience of odor valence during olfactory
imagery can be verified using behavioral non-verbal measure such
as sniff patterns and response time. These secondary measures
establish the occurrence of the qualitative experience of valence
in olfactory imagery.
The preservation of secondary measures of sniff-rates (as well
as other behavioral measures) enables the further inference that
the experiential quality is being conserved in olfactory imagery.
However, even with the corroborations of secondary measures
it might still be objected that the subjects are merely employing
their tacit knowledge of olfactory perception in generating their
reports and behavior during these experiments.
Similar criticisms have been used against visual imagery, how-
ever critiques of this variety gain no traction in the case of
olfactory imagery. The sniff responses in these cases make it
absurd to claim that these states might be merely modulate by
our propositional knowledge of olfactory perception, but contain
no actual qualitative character. It seems fanciful that we could
modulate our breathing and sniffing patterns in such a precise
and automatic manner when we barely pay attention to these
facets of our olfactory experience in normal cases of perceptions.
Furthermore, our olfactory experiences are arguably not format-
ted in the same fashion as our descriptive linguistic resources
(Young et al., 2014). If olfactory perceptual experiences andmem-
ories that we are conscious of are not formatted in the objections
prescribed descriptive format it would be rather surprising if the
same format was not preserved in olfactory imagery. Moreover, it
has been shown that an increase in overall Anhendonia decreases
our ability for olfactory imagery (Bensafi and Rouby, 2007; Rouby
et al., 2009) thereby implicating some level of qualitative character
in mediating olfactory imagery.
We can cognitively generate an olfactory experience that has an
olfactory quality mimicking veridical perception in terms of its
subjective report, behavioral measures, physiological responses,
and cortical activation (Bensafi et al., 2007; Rinck et al., 2009).
The fact that these states conserve and preserve all of these prop-
erties from veridical perception indicates that olfactory imagery
states have a robust olfactory qualitative character. Thereby sup-
porting the claim that any time there is olfactory conscious
awareness these states are also qualitatively conscious.
CONCLUSION
Even while we are unaware of it, a world of odors continually
envelops us exerting a profound influence on our behavior and
the qualitative character of our everyday experiences. These smells
contribute to the quality of our life and have a qualitative charac-
ter such that it is possible for one to be in a qualitative olfactory
state, but not be aware that one is undergoing the experience.
What is even more controversial is that it is not possible for one to
be aware of an olfactory experience without it having a qualitative
character.
Olfactory qualitative-consciousness occurs in the absence
of awareness, as demonstrated by research on social acquain-
tance selection, mate selection, and the Argument from Absence
derived from the anosmic’s decreased quality of life measures.
Thus, the occurrence of olfactory qualitative-consciousness in
the absence of awareness is compatible with Block’s treatment of
phenomenal consciousness and shows his distinction to be appli-
cable to olfaction. The second line of evidence that all states of
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olfactory awareness are qualitatively-conscious suggests that the
dissociation between these kinds of consciousness differs from
expectations derived from vision studies. Further research is cer-
tainly called for, but at this initial stage of inquiry it seems
plausible that qualitative-consciousness plays a constitutive role
in the formation of olfactory awareness as these states arise at
the sensory level and are elicited whenever we either have an
awareness of an occurent odor experience or attempt to recollect,
imagine, or think about olfactory experiences.
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